Damascus – Issue 4-5 – Mahmoud Al-Hamza
Since the Arab revolutions began in Tunisia and Egypt in January-February 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced in Germany that these “revolutions” were unwelcome in Russia.
It is noteworthy to mention the position of the veteran diplomat and scholar, academic Yevgeny Primakov, who stated at the beginning of the Arab Spring that these revolutions were the result of internal causes and not a global conspiracy.
He confirmed that these revolutions are not Islamic, but rather that Islamists are attempting to dominate them. It is observed that the Russians did not take an antagonistic stance toward the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, even though they were coordinating with Hosni Mubarak. They sent Alexander Sultanov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Envoy of the Russian President to the Middle East, who met with Mubarak the day before his resignation, clearly indicating that he had conveyed Russian leadership’s support for him. However, the situation was different with the revolution in Libya and NATO’s intervention. The Russians believed that the West had deceived them by passing a resolution for a no-fly zone over Libya to prevent Gaddafi from committing massacres against the Libyan rebels, especially in Tripoli, Misrata, and Benghazi.
What happened next was the downfall and killing of Gaddafi. Incidentally, there was a real disagreement among the Russian elite regarding the situation in Libya. The then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, known for his liberal tendencies, agreed to abstain from voting against a resolution in the Security Council, which allowed the decision to pass, leading to the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime. At that time, we remember the criticism of the Russian ambassador in Tripoli toward Medvedev, accusing him of betraying Russian interests by not using the veto to prevent Gaddafi’s overthrow.
We also recall Putin’s words, referring to NATO’s campaign in Libya as a crusade. Here, the Russians felt that the West would not cease using force to topple any regime, but it needed international legal cover. When the revolution began in Syria, the Russians made a strategic decision to ally with Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Iran to prevent the overthrow of Assad’s regime by outside forces, so that it would not become a common method in international relations threatening dictatorial regimes, which are numerous—from Iran and Korea to countries in Central Asia and even the Caucasus.
Ironically, Syrian-Russian relations (economic, political, and commercial) were weak before the outbreak of the revolution. However, the Russians felt that Damascus was the first line of defense for them and their main ally, Iran, within the Shiite crescent that the Russians preferred due to its perceived lack of threat in stirring up Muslims within Russia.
The reasons for the Russian negative stance on the Syrian revolution are multifaceted. Some relate to the personality of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who wanted to prove to the West that Russia is a great power and that the West should consider its interests and those of its allies, especially China, BRICS countries, and Iran. In other words, Putin, using the sentiments of Russian imperial nationalism, sought to demonstrate to the West that Russia would not allow the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad—not out of love for Bashar himself, but to assert the notion of Russian decision-making independence and its readiness to defend Russian interests to the end.
Certainly, the mechanism of Russian decision-making is quite similar to that in the Syrian regime. The Russian president’s administration, including security, military, political, and economic advisors, is responsible for shaping the understanding of events. It appears that they made a strategic decision to defend Assad’s regime because they were defending their interests in arms sales, gas exports, and maintaining their strategic positions in the Mediterranean.
I recall the words of a Russian military advisor working at the Geopolitical Academy in Russia when he stated in a program on “Russia Today” that the Russian military ships in the Mediterranean near the Syrian shores do not defend Russia’s interests but rather the interests of the military-technical complex and the Russian oil and gas sector. Here lies the most crucial explanation for the context of the Russian negative stance on the Syrian revolution.
Of course, the Russians are very concerned about the Islamic tide that reminds them of the events in Chechnya and the Gulf support that Islamic fighters received in the Caucasus to confront the Russian presence there.
It is well-known that many young Muslims in Russia (with over 20 million Muslims in Russia, more than 95% of whom are Sunni) are following the events of the Arab Spring and showing sympathy for the Arab and Islamic peoples against the totalitarian regimes. In one of the conferences dedicated to discussing the position of Muslims in Russia regarding Russian foreign and security policy, political analysts expressed that there is a buildup of frustration among young Muslims, particularly in the Caucasus, who are uneasy with Russian foreign policy that supports dictatorial regimes.
In order to justify the Russian stance that is unjust towards the legitimate demands of the Syrian people and biased in favor of the Assad regime, which is killing its people and destroying its country, the Russians have devised a political, media, diplomatic, and psychological plan to defend the Syrian regime and tarnish the image of the Syrian revolution and the opposition.
In addition to providing advanced weaponry and the expertise of military, security, and political advisors, the Russians have harnessed their media outlets in Russian, Arabic, and other languages to defend the Assad regime and combat the Syrian opposition and revolution. The most prominent example is the role played by “Russia Today,” the “Voice of Russia” radio station, and the “RIA Novosti” news agency, which broadcast news about the Syrian regime in excruciating detail, as well as the statements from the Russian Foreign Ministry, which have set records in the number of statements regarding events in Syria.
To the extent that some have begun to mockingly say that Lavrov is the Syrian foreign minister, rather than al-Moallem.
On another front, the Russian leadership devised a plan to work not only on the front of the Syrian regime and support it and its claims that it is defending itself and that the rebels are provoking it and forcing it to use weapons, but they also took another route, which is to establish extensive contacts with the Syrian opposition to convey to the world that Russia is not biased towards either side in the conflict in Syria, but is rather in favor of international law and the sovereignty of Syria, and that the problems should be solved through dialogue among the Syrians themselves.
Personally, I witnessed a significant part of the communication between the Russian leadership and the Syrian opposition since June 2011, and I was a member of those delegations when the first opposition delegation, led by Dr. Ridwan Ziada, came as representatives of the Syrian Conference for Change that emerged from the Antalya Conference in Turkey, held in May 2011. To be honest, the delegation was well-organized and had a clear plan for discussions with the Russians. The delegation members agreed on distributing the points that should be covered in the dialogue with the Russian Foreign Ministry, but the Russians only allowed the delegation to meet with Mikhail Margelov, and the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement considering that the visit of the Syrian opposition delegation was not official but rather private! The visit was accompanied by a massive media campaign and propaganda against the delegation and the opposition, reaching the point of attempting to assault delegation members at the press conference held at the “RIA Novosti” news agency. The Russian response was good and friendly, but it had no political value. Margelov stated at the time that “Russia has one friend in Syria, which is the Syrian people,” and the opposition rejoiced at this statement. However, the official political stance in Russia was so bad it is indescribable.
In early autumn 2011, another delegation from the Syrian Conference for Change arrived, led by Ammar al-Qurbi, and the same scenario repeated itself: a meeting with Margelov that yielded nothing new. However, the Russians were touting the notion that Russia is negotiating with everyone in Syria, as if they were exploiting these visits to cover their support for the regime and provide it with new opportunities to continue suppressing the revolution.
The visit of the Syrian National Council delegation, led by Dr. Burhan Ghalioun, in November 2011 was different, as this time the meeting was with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his deputy Mikhail Bogdanov.
Unfortunately, the discussions were of no benefit except that they reaffirmed the Russian position supporting the Syrian regime on the one hand and confirmed the delegation’s commitment to the goals of the Syrian revolution on the other. That day, after a lengthy discussion, Lavrov asked the delegation—of which I was a member—whether they wanted a revolution or negotiations. Dr. Burhan Ghalioun responded that we are conducting a revolution in Syria, and negotiations are a means to achieve the goal of ousting Bashar and his regime. Lavrov replied, “Then expect a sea of blood.” That phrase clearly illustrates the essence of the Russian stance towards the revolution and the Assad regime.
The Russians, like Western countries, were always looking for arguments to criticize the revolutionary and Syrian opposition forces, accusing them of being either fragmented and ununified, lacking a clear political agenda, or being dominated by Islamists, or receiving their instructions from Western capitals. They accused opposition figures of receiving funds from foreign powers, labeling them as traitors. For example, I personally faced such accusations in Russia, being accused of receiving millions of dollars from France, Qatar, the Hariri group, and others—not only from the Syrian regime’s lackeys in Russia but also from various Russian entities.
As for the last visit of the Syrian National Council in July 2012, I worked a lot to achieve it in coordination with the Middle East and North Africa Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The idea was as follows: a delegation of experts from the National Council would conduct preliminary discussions with experts from the Russian Foreign Ministry to reach points of understanding, followed by an official visit by a delegation from the leadership of the Syrian National Council to crown these consultations and announce an agreement between the Syrian opposition and Russia regarding the fate of the Syrian revolution and the fate of the Syrian regime, starting from offering guarantees to the Russian side regarding all their interests in Syria, including the port of Tartus, oil and economic projects, and military deals. We also had the idea of assuring the Russians that they would continue to help us modernize the Syrian army and that we wanted them to contribute to building a new Syria.
I coordinated in multiple sessions with experts in the Middle East Department on this matter and requested a meeting with the executive office of the council to discuss and prepare for the visit.
I indeed visited Istanbul at the invitation of the executive office of the Syrian National Council, and we held three meetings dedicated to discussing the Russian position and its implications and the necessity of devising a plan to work with the Russians.
I returned to Moscow and informed the Russians about the results of the meetings in Istanbul. However, I noticed a lack of enthusiasm from the Russians for conducting preliminary discussions.
I understood the situation because the Russians cannot decide anything with their experts; they can only echo the official position and listen to what the negotiator says. I was surprised that the brothers in the National Council also rushed to set a date for the visit without prior coordination with me, and I was against hastening the visit.
However, the Russians coordinated the visit date through Paris to circumvent what we had strived for in preparing for the visit to yield serious, tangible results. Thus, the council’s delegation arrived, led by Dr. Abdul Basit Sida, along with several members of the executive office, including members of the council like George Sabra, Burhan Ghalioun, Riyad Seif, Basma Qudmani, Khalid al-Saleh, Najib al-Ghadhan, Munther Makhos, Muhammad Sarmini, and I as the council’s representative in Russia.
The large and high-level composition of the delegation was evidence of the leadership of the council’s interest in this visit, but unfortunately, the Russians gave it no importance. On the contrary, Lavrov met the delegation with harsh and categorical language, reiterating the official Russian position that Russia is keen on the sovereignty of Syria and the application of international law, and that Syria is a friendly country and that Bashar al-Assad and his family are not friends of Russia, citing that Bashar did not visit Russia until five years after he assumed the presidency in Syria, and that none of the Assad family members studied in Russia, but rather in Western countries. The meeting was heated because the Syrian delegation’s response was strong and clear, with no ambiguity. The delegation affirmed the constants of the Syrian revolution.
After this visit, I became convinced of the reality that the Russian stance would not change and that all misleading statements such as “Bashar has delayed reforms,” or “Bashar must conduct reforms or step down,” or “Russia is not committed and is not attached to individuals, including Bashar himself,” were all just attempts to throw dust in the eyes and influence the opposition, as well as to provide new opportunities for Assad to continue his desperate attempts to eliminate the revolution.
Incidentally, I became convinced that the Russians were confident that Bashar, with Russian and Iranian support, would crush the revolution within a short time, at most one year, which was the date of Putin’s election as president of Russia (March 2012). However, they were surprised by the resilience of the revolution and gave Bashar another opportunity, increasing the level of support in weapons and experts. Apparently, the visit of Lavrov and Fradkov (the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service) in May 2012, contrary to the expectations of many who were optimistic about a change in the Russian stance, was aimed at giving Bashar another chance and timing for him to crush the revolution; otherwise, the Russians would find themselves in a predicament before the international community. It is enough to note that the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service rarely visits a country unless something unusual occurs, and their visit came to support Assad, not to persuade him to step down.
The hopes of the Syrians for a change in the Russian stance faded day by day. Days have proven that the Russians seek, in all their meetings with the opposition and its various factions, to convince them to sit at the negotiating table with the Assad regime—in other words, to abort the Syrian revolution, which Russia sees as a threat to itself as much as it is to the rulers of Damascus.
The Syrian Opposition in Russia
In this context, it is necessary to say a few brief words about the situation of the Syrian opposition in Russia and the pressures and challenges it faced.
Historically, it is known that the Syrian community in Russia operates under the umbrella of
www.new-syria.com
